Social Virtues in Taking Care of the Image of Others

Abstract
The Philosophy of Care finds in human life a sort of calling to take care of each other. This vocation for every human being is based on the vulnerability that belongs to the human condition. Among ordinary dimensions of vulnerability/care (such as eating, resting, learning, transporting, nurturing), one that is very ordinary and even broader is that of image. Theory of Politeness deals with this image care, responding to its vulnerabilities.

Care is a central reality of human relationality, which requires a process of practical learning. Virtues are the concrete reality of the growth of the person. Pertinent for image care are the virtues related to truth, those related to dependence and autonomy, and the traditionally-called social virtues. After a long evolution of the latter from classical thought to the Middle Ages, it remains a system of virtues that illuminates the current way to perceive the image, its care, and the rights and duties related to image. The current propensity to safeguard goods through laws is transforming the type of “debt” that corresponds to virtues like truthfulness, liberality and affability, earlier acknowledged as being not very coercive. Leaving aside possible political proposals, this phenomenon draws attention to the deep humanity of such fields, where people sometimes presume a responsibility that presses the conscience more than duties endorsed by laws. The vocation to care transforms everybody into a caregiver, with the widest sphere in the case of the image.

Keywords: Care Philosophy – Politeness – Social Virtues – Affability – Vulnerability question

A study on virtues from the perspective of care and related to the management of the image implies an anthropological approach to politeness through the specific skills of Care Philosophy. This attempt at a deeper understanding of themes that pertain to pragmatics and rhetoric has already been introduced with an explanation of the link with Fundamental Rhetoric (cf. Jiménez Cataño 2014) and again later with the definite consideration of virtues (cf. Jiménez Cataño 2018).

In close synthesis, a specific vulnerability that is the origin of a specific dependence belongs to the human condition. This dependence has to be acknowledged as genuinely human, not as the non-human in us (cf. MacIntyre 1999). It is an interdependence (cf. Tronto, 1993: 101), because the dependence is common, and the answer to it is a care that every person has to offer to others (cf. Noddings [1984] 1986; Tronto 1993: 162-163). The proper object of the Theory of Politeness has usually been formulated as

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protection of image. Such protection can be viewed as care. Image care is the most ordinary and universal care that one can offer to other people.

**Virtues and care**

In spite of the centrality of care in the human condition, it is so essential that Heidegger said that care is the being of the human being (cf. [1927] 1977: 240), and its exercise cannot be pure spontaneity: it has to be learned. Such practical learning is the essence of virtues, a very wide reality where more specific instances have to be identified for the specific field of care. Virtues related to image are recognizable in very classical taxonomies of virtues, and the same can be said about virtues of relationship.

Before going to these classifications of virtues and to their connections with care, a definition of care is necessary. There are significant differences among authors in the way to conceive this notion, not only in reference to the specific nuances of the concept but also in reference to the extent; for example, whether care is considered an action that takes place only between persons or can also include other living beings or even things, and whether or not reciprocity is needed. Heidegger’s notion of Sorge is very restricted with regard to its subject, which is the human being (is the being self of the human being), and very wide with regard to its object, which is every human being and the rest of beings (cf. [1927] 1977: 240ff). In an explanation of care through the notion of dwelling, care is described as dwelling “near the things” (*bei den Dingen*; cf. Heidegger [1951] 2000: 153).

Of similar breadth is the definition by Tronto and Fisher, often repeated afterwards by Tronto:

> On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a *species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible*. That world includes our body, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web. (Fisher-Tronto 1991: 40).

Here the range of care is deliberately broad, and it is clear that those domains are the object of care, yet the consideration is very often about people who take care of people. When Tronto enumerates four phases of care (“caring about, taking care of, care-giving, and care receiving”; 1993: 106), the end of the process is especially pertinent for people, as emerges in another definition that is presented as provisional: “an *action*, which […] has its *origin* in the caregiver and its *completion* in the cared for. The mark of this completion is *some sort of response* by the cared for indicating that his or her needs have been met” (González-Iffland 2000: 4).

**Bodily condition**

Relevant for the notion of care is overcoming a ballast that characterizes modern sensitivity, a sort of pride of the intellectual/rational condition of human being (the Cartesian *res cogitans*), which means shame in front of man’s corporeal or animal dimension. This modern sensitivity is explicit in Freud when he speaks of the “outrage” (*Krankung*) of discovering the animal origin of human being (cf. 1946: 295).

The semantics of “animal” and its translations conditions our understanding of this subject in a particular way, as human beings can be more or less involved under this concept. In the Ancient and
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Medieval Latin worlds ’animal’ is a normal genus that includes the species ’man’. In Greek ’zoon’ means animal but also (and first) living being. In German the nuance is different: ’Tier’ means beast, irrational animal. Medieval “Porphyry’s trees” use the series of genera/species: substance > body > living > animal > man, because in Latin the difference between “vivens” and “animal” is clear, but in the chapter on species of Porphyry’s well-known book, we read “animate body” (émpsykon soma) instead of “living” (Isagoge: 4, 23).

When, according to Freud, Darwin showed man’s “ineradicable animal nature” (“die Unvertilgbarkeit seiner animalischen Natur”, Freud 1946: 295), based on man’s “descent from the animal kingdom” (“die Abstammung aus dem Tierreich”), the sensitivity to perceive this revelation as outrageous was not very old if we put its origin in Descartes’ division of all that exists in res cogitans and res extensa. Freud keeps his distance from the root tier in Tierreich and, when he speaks of human nature, he uses the adjective animalisch. This would have sounded naïve before Descartes, when animal nature of man was so familiar that Thomas Aquinas rarely writes “men and animals” preferring to say “men and other animals”.

Humans and care

Whether in pure minds there can be dependence and their relationships can have the modality of care, is outside of our scope here. Our human experience is that dependence and care are linked to a corporeal condition, which introduces contingency, and to a social nature, which means that human beings flourish through interpersonal relationships, and part of this process is overcoming fragility.

A person’s flourishing is a growth that becomes concrete in man’s faculties in the form of virtues. Faculties grow through virtues, or better said: virtues are faculties’ growth. Although there are taxonomies of the virtues that follow the subject (i.e., to what faculty every virtue belongs), here the criterion will be the object, namely virtues that make man better in relation to others, i.e. in social life.

Care is clearly a central part of social life. Taking care and being cared for go beyond extreme situations like childhood, old age, sickness and poverty. There are very ordinary dimensions of dependence, for example, activities related to eating, resting, learning, transporting, and nurturing. These everyday dependences are everyday dimensions of care, yet they are not so ordinary as image care. Those everyday activities are performed with a small number of people, belonging to little communities such as a family, school or neighbourhood. Image care is equally real and much wider in scope (cf. Jiménez Cataño 2014). Its meaning is vital in the mentioned communities, but it also has a role outside of them, in every human encounter.

For the care of image, virtues of truth obviously could be considered (cf. Jiménez Cataño 2018); as well as the sets of virtues proposed by McIntyre as “virtues of the acknowledged dependence” (cf. 1999: 119-128; Gilson 2014: 20) and “virtues of the independent practical reasoner” (cf. McIntyre 1999: 81-98). All these virtues pertain to care, of course. However, as already said, our purpose here is to consider social virtues. They offer a focus on the levels of responsibility that is particularly meaningful in

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1 Truthfulness, modesty, sincerity, loyalty, etc.
2 A mixture of justice and generosity and the sets of “virtues of giving” (generosity, industriousness, prudence and discrimination) and “virtues of receiving” (gratitude, courtesy and forbearance).
3 Justice, temperance, truthfulness, courage.
current times, due to both the development of pragmatics and some recent changes in the way to perceive social relationships.

Social virtues

Actually, all virtues in these sets are social in different, even eminently social, ways. The expression refers to a classical taxonomy wherein virtues related to justice are “social.” As essence of being just consists of giving to each his/her own, justice and related virtues are considered social by excellence, yet it is difficult to find a virtue without any social dimension. Some parts of temperance could appear rather individual, but also personal sobriety is meaningful for the community.

The Aristotelian system of virtues in the Middle Ages is mediated by the Stoic tradition (cf. MacIntyre 1985: 180, 178; Nederman 2005: 189). It is a long process that also passes through Cicero and Macrobius (cf. Bejczy 2005: 143; De Marchi 2010: 115-118; Budziszewski 2017: 242-266). In the medieval period, this system is essentially the same in different schools. The classic scheme of cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance) develops in an organic complex of linked virtues applying different ways of analysing a whole in its parts. One of these analyses considers the essence of the whole as an analogous concept whose parts do not fully respond to it. Such subordinated virtues undoubtedly have the profile of the cardinal virtue but do not meet all the criteria of its definition. They are therefore called “potential parts.” In the case of justice, this failure can regard equality, for example the impossibility of giving back to God everything one has received from Him (virtue of religion), or similarly to the parents or to the homeland (virtue of piety, pietas), and there are a few more cases.

The other failure, relevant to the current subject, is the lack of coercibility. Truthfulness, gratitude, liberality, friendliness, indulgence (or equity, epieikeia), and similar virtues are not strictly coercible. In The Merchant of Venice, when the attorney (Portia) says in the court “Then must the Jew be merciful,” Shylock replies: “On what compulsion must I? Tell me that.” The strictness of law that distinguishes a court highlights the weakness of mercy in this aspect. The convenience of mercy has to be argued.

Levels of responsibility

A distinction between morality and law would be very strong and characteristic in the transition to Modern thought, and there is the impression that it was not present in Medieval times. In fact it was clearly present in the theological system of virtues: “As Thomas [Aquinas] explains, there is a difference between moral debt (debitum morale) and legal debt (debitum legale). Legal debt is ruled by the virtue of justice itself, while moral debt is governed by virtues connected to justice” (Decock 2013: 197-198). What Shylock stresses is the non-existence of a legal debt to be merciful. “Virtues connected to justice” means that their essence is giving something owed, and mercy is perceived exactly as something beyond

4 “The moral obligations that we are going to deal with, refer to the goods that form the bridge between those goods related to the social-personal sphere and those of the social-material sphere. Without honesty, truthfulness and fidelity a moral order of human social life is impossible” (Mausbach-Ermecke 1959:1105).

5 Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, Act I, scene 1 (http://shakespeare.mit.edu/merchant/full.html).
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duty. “Thomas explains that some types of human exchange cannot fall within the scope of the virtue of justice, strictly understood, because they fall short of perfect equality. In principle, the virtue of justice is geared towards giving another person his due so that equality in between these persons is maintained” (Decock 2013: 198).

Moralists seem not to take truth very seriously, as the gravity of behaviours against truthfulness usually is not considered high. But this is valid in cases where there is a lack of precision, holding back to not give a bad impression or for convenience, or even because it is not relevant for a conversation and seems more practical to overlook. Calumny and all harmful false information are considered very different (they are high in gravity), exactly like detraction, which does harm even though it is true. In this case there is a strict duty of justice. In the former case the debt is different, with a wide range of possibilities. This is the field of violations of the maxim of quality in Grice’s principle of cooperation: literal falsehoods that are true in their well-interpreted meaning, especially rhetorical figures and strategies of politeness. This is what Robin Lakoff declares: “It is considered more important in a conversation to avoid offense than to achieve clarity. This makes sense, since in most informal conversations actual communication of important ideas is secondary to merely reaffirming and strengthening relationships” (1973, 297-298). What Lakoff affirms also goes beyond such violations of literal truth: inexactnesses that one does not consider relevant, at least not more important than the relationship. This could be in fact a behaviour against truthfulness, a real violation of virtue. Such “soft” falsehoods would not be a problem of justice but of honesty:

The first conclusion to be drawn from Thomas is that legal debt is owed by virtue of justice (iustitia), while moral debt is owed by the related virtue of honesty (honestas). Thomas goes on to explain that not all moral debt must necessarily be rendered for the virtue of honesty to be observed. He distinguishes between moral debt that must be rendered lest honesty be violated, and moral due that does not break honesty, even if it is not rendered. (Decock 2013: 198).

For the sensitivity or our time, “integrity” might be clearer than “honesty”. Having integrity, being a whole person is what is expressed by the term honestas. Being honest nowadays has a narrower sense. And here appears a new distinction after that between justice and honesty. People who lie about little, non-harmful things, are not unjust, but have no integrity. And the same could be said about ungrateful people and about people who, after causing inconveniences, do not compensate those involved. People like this are not “bad people,” but they are not “whole people” either.

This is the new level: virtues that, when violated, do not imply the loss of integrity. Lacking in liberality, affability, or friendship does not mean lacking integrity. One can say: “Yes, he is a little cantankerous, but do not worry, he is a whole person.”

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6 Detraction is “a malicious discrediting of someone’s character, accomplishments, etc., as by revealing hidden faults or by slander (Collins Dictionary, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/it/dizionario/inglese/detraction). Diffamatio had in moral theology and in jurisprudence this technical meaning of telling something negative although true about someone without right or necessity.

7 “Examples of the former include moral debt owed as a matter of truthfulness in speaking to others (veritas), gratefulness in compensating another person for a benefit (gratia), and vindication in ‘compensating’ another person for an evil act (vindicatio). Performing this type of moral debt is absolutely required if moral honesty is to be preserved (sine eo honestas morum conservari non potest).” (Decock 2013: 198)
Examples of the latter type of moral debt, which is conducive to virtue but not absolutely necessary, include what is due by virtue of liberality (liberalitas), affability (affabilitas), or friendship (amicitia). These types of debt are much less coercive. Moral rectitude can be attained without practicing liberality or friendship (sine quo honestas conservari potest). It will merely make life less complete from a moral point of view” (Decock 2013, 198-199).

Someone can be a whole person without being very generous. Mercy, as mentioned in The Merchant of Venice, would be part of this. And for many authors this is also the place for epieikeia, that ability to reasonably applying a rule, taking into account the specific conditions of individuals and situations; therefore it is translated as indulgence, mildness, or equity.

**Politeness and duty**

The sphere of politeness seems to lie here. This is the level of duty corresponding to the heedfulness that Brown and Levinson declare as the core of their treatise on politeness, in the conclusion of a very central paragraph that highlights reciprocity in the vulnerability of the face and the reciprocity in the attention to the face (cf. 1987: 61). Politeness would have the same “weakness” as mercy: it is not coercible. Why is politeness an acknowledged value? From a psychological point of view, the human need for esteem is a basic instinct, and “man receives this image of the value of his self, above all, from the judgement of his fellows” (Lersch [1938] 1966: 135⁸). There is impoliteness and impolite people, but this has nothing to do with the lack of coercibility, because there is also injustice and unjust people. The evil introduced into a life by a rape is very different from the evil introduced by an angry reply. However, justice and injustice are not the same, just as politeness and impoliteness are not the same. The reason to be polite cannot be purely pragmatic, as it could seem from the words of Brown and Levinson: “It is in general in every participant’s best interest to maintain each other’s face, that is to act in ways that assure the other participants that the agent is heedful of the assumptions concerning face” (1987, 61). Such assumptions are the definition of face: “the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself.”

A purely pragmatic reason to be polite would be the interest to preserve one's own face: there will be more possibilities for one's face to be preserved by others if one preserves the face of others. However this is not the atmosphere of the book, which does not reflect such utilitarianism. That claiming a public self-image for oneself has a deeper reading from an anthropological point of view. This is no matter of frivolity or vanity or calculation of benefits, but concerns the identity between person and image, which over centuries has been morally developed through the notions of honour and fame (or reputation), not only as a right but also as a duty. “From a standpoint of ethics, first of all, it should be noted that people and institutions, possessors of the right of reputation, have a moral duty to take care of their good name and to protect it” (Rodríguez Luño 2014: 31). For a relational sociology this is a case of common good, in

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⁸ Here, Lersch quotes William James: “No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such a thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof. If no one turned round when we entered, answered when we spoke, or minded what we did, but if every person we met cut us dead, and acted as if we were non-existing things, a kind of rage and impotent despair would ere long well up in us, from which the cruelest bodily tortures would be a relief” (1918: 293-294). Abraham Heschel writes something similar that adds a meaningful nuance: “Personal needs come and go, but one anxiety remains: Am I needed? (…) Unlike all other needs, the need of being needed is a striving to give rather than to obtain satisfaction” (1965: 57, 60).
the sense of its having been ‘produced together’ (cf. Donati 1991: p. 15), which makes it valid that “your good is my good”: I do not seek your good thinking that in some way it is more probable that I will receive a good, but because your good is in itself a good for me. The basis of this is the nature of person, which is intrinsically constituted by relation to others.

**Relationality**

Philosophy of Care deals with a region of this web of relations in the form of common fragility and care. Care is a good produced together, it “has its origin in the caregiver and its completion in the cared for,” as already quoted (González-Iffland 2000: 4), and this completion has relevant ethic consequences. Eva Kittay is very profound on this point:

I want to insist that when we do not receive care graciously, we harm more than ourselves. We can refuse care graciously either by refusing care or by accepting the care but not doing so graciously. In either case, we fail to complete the care of the other and so undermine more than our own good. (…) When we refuse care offered in good faith and with the requisite competence, we refuse relationship. In the case of people to whom we are close, this can be a painful rejection of our expression of love and concern. In the case of people who are giving care professionally, this is a frustration of their duty and obligation (Kittay 2014: 39-40).

The words “we harm more than ourselves” are an eloquent signal of the relationality, of the common good or relational good. Here the question about the type of duty would be pertinent, but this quote refers to a wider field than the present reflection (domestic services, education, care of sick or old persons, etc.). What does image care, the giving and receiving of care of the image, mean? This is the object of the above-mentioned virtue of affability, whose duty is the lowest; that is, it is not only not legal, but the moral debt that can be violated without loss of integrity.

**Conclusion: a new view on the debt in the field of image**

At the beginning we spoke of “some recent changes in the way to perceive social relationships.” These concern a transformation of the type of debt that includes this field of virtues. One can feel an even greater sensitivity that demands affability with the force of the law. Words spoken on the street or glances are often perceived as offensive and people must stand penal trial for actions that earlier would have simply created a bad opinion like “he/she has no good taste,” and even without legal consequences this is a new moralism that a few years ago would have been seen as bigotry. This transformation presents many problems, both of justice and of applicability, due to the difficulty of getting an objectivity that makes a general formulation feasible. A person with the mentioned social virtues is able to deal with circumstances in the particularity of real life.

In any case, independently from the justification and applicability of such a transformation of the debt (for example the feasibility of overcoming the subjectivity), this phenomenon illuminates the anthropological dimension of debts. Is every good that is protected by the law really higher, and is a good protected by a moral rule lower? Many laws at the present and throughout history are clearly
circumstantial and strategic, linked to a sensitivity of the current time. This is not to speak of laws that almost everyone could perceive as unjust: slavery, racially-based laws, and so many others. In this way, the “weakness” we have applied to virtues ruled by honesty becomes the contrary: it is more authentically human and personal to act for moral convictions, not for legal constriction (and still more, if so many “legal” situations are now clearly inhuman).

We are transforming into legal duties many moral duties of the past; we think that we are making progress when we enact a law that defends what was previously a moral conviction. The “illumination” that this phenomenon is offering consists of a new attention to the moral value before the legal debt, and the most meaningful emphasis falls on the human resources to live this new (or rediscovered) paradigm. Governing life with laws is a very intellectualist position: promulgations of laws do not change human beings. Moreover, when the law is known, its enforcement can be very arduous and even unreal. Moral debt is linked to virtues, and virtues require education. An illustration of this different mindset is that in recent times we write the texts of the laws on the walls of parliaments, where in other centuries the virtues of good governance were represented, as was done by Ambrogio Lorenzetti (14th Century) in the Palazzo Pubblico of Siena (Carlotti 2010).

The rights to the protection of one’s image, to information, and to privacy can of course be a matter of strict justice. However, every life is full of situations with real debts in personal relationships, in which the light of affability, pity, gratitude, and other virtues that are related more to honesty than to legal justice, can offer more clarity than the recourse to legal debt. This does not make ordinary relationships less important. On the contrary, it offers reasons to see how deep humanity is involved in them. If for many people the way to walk is the formulation of a law, this could be viewed as a natural, instinctive way to recognize more significance in the responsibility perceived in the face of a human being.

On this basis, when the subject is the image of others, the common figure of the “caregiver,” a role reserved to the ones who help and protect individuals in vulnerable situations such as illness, disability, or old age, becomes part of every human encounter contemplated by pragmatics. From the common vulnerability (of face, in this case) and reciprocal care, it derives that, at least in this field, every human being is a caregiver, since both speaker and addressee have to take care of each others’ faces.

References


